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JOHN VONDERHAAR HALTOM, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
—000O000— 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court granted Certiorari to decide what standard of negligence applies to 
§76-10-1206( 1) U.C. A. Certainly the Court has agreed to consider all valid arguments 
by Defendant in support of his contention that the Court of Appeals wrongly decided 
this question; and the weight of authority proves Defendant's contention that criminal 
negligence is required. 
Once that decision is made, it is necessary to decide whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the verdict in the Trial Court; and Defendant believes 
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that the evidence is legally insufficient. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A DETERMINATION OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NECESSARY TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT; AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
CHANGING THE STANDARD WITHOUT FULL BRIEFING ON THAT ISSUE. 
Regarding the standard of criminal negligence, the State starts is Brief by 
setting forth its understanding of Defendant's arguments on the criminal negligence 
standard. It then claims that two out of three of Defendant's arguments were not 
properly brought before the Court of Appeals, and cannot be considered by this 
Court. The first point relates to the necessity of a scienter requirement in a case 
involving the First Amendment. The second argument regards the violation of due 
process implicit in punishing Defendant for the acts of an employee. The State then 
curiously states: "the second and third arguments were not raised in or addressed by 
the Court of Appeals and, therefore, cannot properly be raised for the first time on 
certiorari." This assertion is made by a party that admittedly did not raise any 
agreements against the use of a criminal negligent standard in the District Court. It 
was only before the Court of Appeals that the State, for the first time, argued that a 
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simple negligence standard should be sufficient. Because they did this in 
Respondent's Brief, and did not fully brief that point, Defendant had inadequate 
opportunity to respond to those arguments. The Court of Appeals did not find "plain 
error" and should not have considered the State's arguments for a lower standard of 
negligence at that time. It is the lack of opportunity that Defendant had below to even 
address the State's arguments, mostly made during oral arguments, that most certainly 
denies Defendant his right to Due Process of law. To assert at this time that 
Defendant cannot now fully address those issues, during his first opportunity to do 
so, has not merit whatsoever. This Court, granted Certiorari to decide the important 
legal question of the standard of negligence required for conviction; now is the time 
to fully brief it. 
The State claims that Defendant "presents no authority which equates a 'failure 
to exercise reasonable care' with a higher standard than simple negligence." (Aplee. 
Br. 18). The State further claims that Defendant "wholly ignores this Court's holding 
in Martinez" which Respondent characterizes as recognizing "the legislative 
prerogative to dispense with traditional elements of culpability". (Id 17-18). 
Defendant believes that he has fully addressed the issues raised by the State. It is not 
clear that the legislature intended to dispense with the traditional requirement of 
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culpability in this matter. The legislature made another attempt to clarify the meaning 
of this statute, and the level of care required, in its 2005 session. The fact that the 
standard needed clarification makes it most obvious that it was not clear. The fact that 
the "clarified" standard makes no more sense than the original version suggests that 
the clarification did not help much. 
Defendant also claims that in areas where the First Amendment is implicated, 
all doubt must be resolved in favor of the Defendant. To do otherwise, would 
impermissibly chill those attempting to exercise their First Amendment rights. While 
Respondent cites United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 US 64 (1994) for the 
proposition that more restrictions are permitted in the area of sexually explicit 
materials, it does not attempt to respond to the Court's holding in that case that 
scienter must be read into the statute to avoid a conflict with the First Amendment. 
Respondent replies to the Due Process arguments of Defendant in one short 
conclusory statement (Aplee. Br. 22). Once again, the State relies on its argument 
that it is too late for Defendant to raise these arguments, despite being blind sided 
before the Court of Appeals. The State has never attempted to justify its new theory 
of the case on appeal, after allowing jury instructions to be given about objection. 
Thus, the State appears to argue that it is not constrained by its failure to raise certain 
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issues in the trial court; but yet Defendant does not get to fully respond to those 
arguments. Defendant believes that Certiorari was granted in this Court in part 
because there was no opportunity to adequately respond to the State's argument 
before the Court of Appeals. Certainly to exclude Defendant's arguments at this 
point, while accepting the belated arguments of the State, violates due process. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE TO CONVICT IS IMPLICIT IN THE GRANT OF 
CERTIORARI. 
The State quotes Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4) which states this Court will consider 
only those issues which are "fairly included" within the Petition for Certiorari. 
Defendant, in his Brief before this Court, addressed the sufficiency of the evidence 
because it most certainly is a subsidiary question fairly included within the grant of 
Certiorari. If the Court considers the level of negligence required for conviction, and 
determines that the level of negligence is something other than simple negligence, 
there is no way to avoid the question of whether the State met that burden. The Court 
of Appeals did not address it, because of its ruling that simple negligence was 
sufficient. If it is not addressed by this Court, Defendant would be denied the remedy 
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that he so clearly merits. Respondent claims that, if the Court finds that the Court of 
Appeals used the wrong standard of negligence, it should thereafter remand the case 
to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. Defendant believes that this Court 
should follow through on its ruling and review the evidence to determine whether it 
is sufficient to sustain a conviction on the basis of criminal negligence, once that has 
been determined as the proper standard. 
The State claims that "defendant acknowledges his marshaling burden, but does 
not fulfill it." (Resp. Br. 25). The State then claims that "defendant merely reargues 
the merits of his trial defense". Defendant has, in fact, marshaled the evidence 
carefully. The statement of facts prepared for the Court of Appeals, and reiterated for 
this case before this Court, sets out in detail the evidence upon which the State relied 
at trial. Most of that evidence is not in controversy. The State, however, misreads 
the law in putting a further burden on Defendant: "yet, defendant draws no inferences 
from this evidence in favor of the jury verdict." (Id.). Respondent suggests that it is 
the duty of Defendant to draw inferences in favor of the verdict, and cites West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991) and State v. Heaps. 
2005 UT 5,999 P.2d 565 (Utah 2000). Those two cases, taken together, do not place 
that burden on Defendant. Defendant's burden is merely that of marshaling "every 
6 
scrap of competent evidence" which supports the verdict, and then "to demonstrate 
why the findings are clearly erroneous" 1818 P.2d at 1313 (Emphasis Added). It is 
then the Court which shall draw the inferences sufficient to sustain the verdict, if 
justified. Defendant does not deny that some inferences adverse to Defendant could 
be drawn from that evidence. Nevertheless, Defendant contends those inferences are 
not strong enough to support a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, Defendant 
believes that they support a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law. 
The statute then attempts to twist the evidence that Defendant produced, with 
the following unsupported statement: 
Defendant testified that when Brittany provided the wrong address, he 
considered terminating the sale, but then decided to give Brittany a second 
chance. See Statement of Facts Supra. Defendant testified that when he made 
this decision, he realized that her wrong answers suggested that the driver's 
license was fake and she was underage. (Emphasis added) (Aplee. Br. 25-26). 
That is a deliberate misreading of the evidence produced at trial. Defendant 
testified that he was specifically asked by Sapergueldiev to go over again with him 
how to check for fake ID's (R.677 P. 222). He checked out her facial features; and he 
asked for her social security number, which she quickly gave him correctly (R.677 
P. 224). When asked her address, it did not comport with the address on the license 
(R. 677 P.225). He did give a brief thought to asking her to leave. Being new in the 
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area, however, he had only recently noticed that many streets were known both by a 
name and a grid number. He testified as follows: 
But then earlier - you know, when you're driving around looking for stuff, 
'cause I had to buy stuff locally there - to build out the store, vou kinda learn 
that you're driving down one street and it's this name and all of a sudden, it's 
a numbered street. 
I asked her, "does it go by another name or number?" and then she rattled off 
the number or the name real quick. And I said ok, 'cause if she knew both 
names, you know, both things, it's got to be her address. (Emphasis Added) (R. 
677 P. 225-26) 
The State also takes issue with Defendant's claim that Sapergueldiev was 
primarily responsible for checking the age of those attempting to enter the store. 
Respondent suggests that because Emily Wright was on duty at the time in question, 
and she had been assigned duty of checking identification, Defendant should not have 
relied on Sapergueldiev. That argument has no merit, as Sapergueldiev was the 
senior employee, responsible for training others in checking identification (R. 677, 
PP. 191-193,201,213-214); and Sapergueldiev set up the schedule, which obviously 
gave him the authority to alter it (R. 677 P.221). 
Respondent closes its Brief with the statement: "In sum, defendant was aware 
of the risk that Brittany might be a minor and aware that if she was a minor, the sale 
of the adult-only video was illegal." (Aplee. Br. 28) That is a misstatement of the 
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evidence. Defendant believes the evidence shows clear that Defendant reasonably 
relied on his most trusted employee to check date of birth, and simply assisted that 
employee, with a specific request, regarding the identity of a customer. Once that 
identity was verified, Defendant had done his job. In order for this conviction to be 
upheld, this Court must determine that Defendant's presence in the store required him 
to double check a responsibility that had been exclusively delegated to his most 
trusted employee. That simply is not the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal erred in misstating the standard of care required of 
Defendant. Once that error is corrected, the evidence for conviction fails, as a matter 
of law. 
DATED t h i s ^ q day of February, 2006. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullougri 
Attorney for Appellant 
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